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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
This thesis will examine the Swedish land allocation system’s relation to competition law and 
economic efficiency.1 A land allocation (markanvisning) is an option for developers that 
concerns the sole right to negotiate with municipalities regarding how a specific area of 
municipal-owned land should be exploited. The negotiations concern formulating a detailed 
development plan (detaljplan) and may be initiated by either the developer or the 
municipality.2 The land is then normally transferred from the municipality to the developer at 
a later stage in the process.3 Land allocations initiated by developers are mainly performed 
through direct allocations (direktanvisningar) meaning that other developers are excluded 
from the process.4 When performing direct allocations developers often allocate resources in 
‘influence costs’ in order to convince municipalities that they have a good and suitable plan 
for how to exploit the land.5 When municipalities, on the other hand, initiate land allocations 
they are mainly performed through tender allocations (anbudsanvisningar) meaning that many 
developers have the chance to participate in the bidding procedure.6 When performing tender 
allocations municipalities often allocate plenty of resources in formulating how they want the 
land to be exploited.7 
The Swedish land allocation system might cause problems of competition law as 
identified by the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) and Carl Caesar et al.8 
Firstly, a majority of municipalities mainly perform direct allocations, which might be 
problematic because small developers believe that they are hindered to entry the market since 
they do not have an established contact with officials of municipalities like larger developers 
have. An established contact with municipalities is of importance in order to receive land 
allocations. Thus, mainly performing direct allocations could mean problems of competition 
law.9 However, performing direct allocations seems cheaper for municipalities compared to 
performing tender allocations. Nevertheless, there are indications that municipalities lose 
financially in land revenues since land prices are identified as higher when the land is 																																																								
1 The purpose is developed in chapter 1.2. 
2 See section 1.1.2 for how land allocations are performed.	
3 C. Caesar, T. Kalbro & H. Lind, Bäste herren på täppan? En ESO-rapport om bostadsbyggande och 
kommunala markanvisningar, Stockholm: Regeringskansliet (2013), p. 35.	
4 See section 1.1.2 for how land allocations are performed. 
5 See chapter 4. 
6 See section 1.1.2 for how land allocations are performed. 
7 See chapter 6.	
8 See chapters 3.1 and 5.1. 
9 See chapter 3.1. 
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transferred after a tender allocation. Thus, it might not be economical for municipalities to 
mainly perform direct allocations as they are doing today.10 
Secondly, the framework concerning how land allocations should be performed is quite 
loose, something which could cause problems of competition law.11 Many developers believe 
that the land allocation system lacks transparency since the proceedings vary amongst 
different municipalities. Developers also meet indirect conditions of implicit nature, not stated 
in land allocation policies, which could hinder small developers to enter the market, as they 
are probably less aware of the indirect conditions compared to larger developers. Moreover, 
there is an obligation to perform indirect expert valuations before starting direct allocation 
procedures but there is no guidance concerning the concept ‘indirect’ which could mean that 
municipalities who perform the expert valuations themselves risk breaching competition law. 
Thus, on the one hand, a loose regulation might lead to incorrect procedures resulting in 
illegal state aid. 12 On the other hand, a loose regulation might be favourable since it provides 
municipalities with more acting space, compared to a stricter framework, which could mean 
an economically efficient land allocation process.13 
A Swedish Competition Authority report from 2013 summarizes some issues concerning 
the land allocation system which could be problematic considering competition law: 
 
In many cases there is a lack of market consideration when allocating land. Decisions 
concerning large economic values are often made by few persons and are often vaguely 
motivated. The procedures are often characterized by a lack of transparency and are 
unpredictable. The system appears arbitrary and there are incitements for different actors on 
the market to act in a socioeconomically inefficient way.14 
 
In order to come to terms with the problems, the Swedish Competition Authority suggests that 
a certain portion of land allocations should be performed through tender allocations since that 
would hinder them from risking breaching the law.15 However, their suggestion might not be 
the most suitable solution in order to have a land allocation system that is both legally 
unproblematic while still economically efficient, as will be discussed in chapter 7. 
1.1.1 The Definition of a ‘Land Allocation’ 
The concept ‘land allocation’ has various explanations in literature. However the legal 
definition within domestic Swedish law, to be found in Lag (2014:899) om riktlinjer för 																																																								
10 See chapter 4.	
11 See chapter 5. 
12 See chapter 5. 
13 See chapter 6. 
14 Konkurrensverket, Konkurrensen i Sverige 2013, Rapport 2013:10, pp. 66–67 (author’s own translation). 
15 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 83. 
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kommunala markanvisningar (hereinafter Act 2014:899), follows:  
 
The meaning of land allocation under this Act is an agreement between a municipality 
and a developer that gives the developer the exclusive right for a limited time and 
under given conditions to negotiate with the municipality on the transfer or assignment 
of a particular municipal-owned land, which is aimed for constructions.16  
 
The expression ‘land allocation’ wrongfully indicates that the allocation itself would include 
transfer of land but in fact it only concerns the sole right to negotiate with municipalities 
about how to exploit the land. A transfer of land from the municipality to the developer is 
normally made at a later stage in the process.17  	
1.1.2 How Land Allocations are Performed 
A land allocation is performed when a municipality or developer initiate negotiations 
concerning the use of municipal-owned land for constructions. When a land allocation is 
performed, the municipality and the developer sign a ‘land allocation agreement’. The 
agreement means that the municipality has chosen to negotiate with a specific developer 
concerning the exploitation of the land while the developer accepts some preliminary 
conditions, for example that the developer shall bear all costs during the detailed development 
plan process. After signing the land allocation agreement the developer has the sole right to 
negotiate with the municipality, which means that the municipality cannot negotiate with 
other developers during the time the land allocation is valid. The negotiations during the 
period of validity of the land allocation concerns coming to an agreement regarding a detailed 
development plan that both the municipality and the developer are satisfied with.18 
There are two typical situations for how municipalities perform land allocations. The 
first situation arises when a municipality has an idea about using a land area for a specific 
purpose. The municipality will, in that situation, make a rough draft of a detailed development 
plan to attract developers for the project. The land allocation is then normally performed 
through a tender allocation, which means that different developers may submit bids and 
compete about exploiting the land. The municipality may then choose the most competent 
developer based on set criteria such as prize, innovation, environmental impact etc. The 
second situation comprises when developers propose an idea concerning how a specific area 
of municipal-owned land should be exploited. This method of performing land allocations is 
called direct allocation and means that only one developer gets the chance to submit a bid 																																																								
16 SFS 2014:899, Lag om riktlinjer för kommunala markanvisningar, § 1. (Author’s own translation).  
17 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 35.	
18 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 38 & 47–48. 
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concerning exploitation of a specific area of municipal-owned land.19 Direct allocation is used 
inter alia as a way to attract developers to deliver creative ideas for how land should be 
developed, which should mean that the aim is to encourage developers to be creative and 
invest money in the initial stage of the project, in exchange that they can be more certain of 
receiving the land.20  
Land allocations are limited in time, but the time can be extended if the actors have not 
come to any agreement before the deadline but they both want more time to negotiate.21 When 
the municipality and the developer come to an agreement the land is typically transferred 
from the municipality to the developer. If the municipality and the developer have not come 
to any agreement when the land allocation expires, the land allocation cooperation ends and 
the municipality is free to negotiate with other developers concerning a detailed development 
plan for the land area.22 
In closing, land allocations mean that developers and municipalities can devote 
resources to negotiations concerning a detailed development plan since the municipality is 
committed to only negotiate with the specific developer, who is bound by certain conditions, 
which means that they both have an interest in coming to an agreement concerning the 
detailed development plan.23 From the developer’s perspective, a land allocation is an option 
to buy or lease municipal-owned land. The option can be returned if the developer for some 
reason does not want to fulfil the purchase. Municipalities are also free to quit the land 
allocation agreement, but typically have an interest in fulfilling it since they have allocated 
resources on formulating a detailed development plan together with the developer.24  
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to, firstly, investigate how municipalities perform land 
allocations, since that will give me accurate material for a judicial analysis of the system. 
Most municipalities mainly perform direct allocations, which seems to cause problems related 
to competition law and I will therefore further examine to what extent they can perform direct 
allocations while still complying with competition law. Moreover, the purpose of this thesis is 																																																								
19 T. Madell & S. Lundberg, Ska vi singla slant? Om försäljning av offentliga tillgångar, Konkurrensverket 
(2008), p. 64–65.  
20 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2015:5, p. 38. 
21 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 37.	
22 C. Caesar, Disposal of municipal land aimed for housing: a critical evaluation of assigning methods applied in 
Sweden, In Municipal Landownership and Housing in Sweden: Exploring links, supply and possibilities (2016), 
p. 6. 
23 Caesar, Disposal of municipal land aimed for housing: a critical evaluation of assigning methods applied in 
Sweden (2016), p. 4.	
24 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 37. 
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to analyse whether the loose land allocation framework leads to problems of competition law. 
Furthermore, since the main purpose of EU state aid regulations is to promote an efficient 
common market, I will investigate whether mainly performing direct allocation, and having a 
loose framework for how to perform land allocations, is economically efficient.25 Lastly, I 
will examine whether the regulations concerning land allocations need any adjustments in 




From the background and the purpose of this thesis, I find four areas that are subject for 
investigation. They can be summarized in the following questions:	
1. How do municipalities perform land allocations? 
2. To what extent can municipalities perform direct allocations while still complying 
with competition law and being economically efficient? 
3. What is the framework concerning how land allocations should be performed? Is it 
compatible with competition law and is it economically efficient? 
4. What adjustments are needed in order for the system to mean fewer problems of 
competition law while still being economically efficient? 
I find these four questions necessary to investigate in order to fulfill the purpose of this thesis. 
The first question will be examined in the beginning of chapters 3 and 5 by using previous 
research that investigates how municipalities perform land allocations. Question 2 will be 
examined in chapters 3 and 4 by using doctrinal analysis, EU judicial method, economic 
analysis of law and the transaction cost theory. Question 3 will be examined in chapters 5 and 
6 by using the same methods as for question 2, and question 4 will be analyzed in the 
concluding discussion (chapter 7) based on the finding from chapters 3–6. 
 
1.4 Demarcation 
Not all land allocations result in transfer of land but some result in the land being leased from 
the municipality to the developer.26 However, I will not consider situations of leasing of land 
in this thesis.27  
 																																																								
25 K. Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), p. 4. 
26 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2015:5, p. 72. 
27 See chapter 7.3 for suggestions for further research.  
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1.5 Material 
When starting to work on this thesis, I searched for “land allocations” at Gothenburg 
University’s database and found an article written by Carl Caesar, who is a previous doctor in 
real estate science at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm with focus on land 
allocations. His investigation indicates that the way municipalities perform land allocations 
could be problematic and he urges for further research to problematize the area on the basis of 
competition. 28  I contacted Caesar who sent me more material on the subject of land 
allocations. In the material I received from Caesar I found that there were many references to 
reports initiated by the Swedish Competition Authority. I contacted the Swedish Competition 
Authority who sent me all reports they have concerning land allocations and competition. 
These materials have been very useful in my work on this thesis, especially researching land 
allocations: both how they are performed and how the system might be problematic. 
I have also searched in the database Zeteo29 for Swedish case law concerning how direct 
allocations are performed and how EU law has been invoked in those situations. There was 
not much case law concerning land allocations that was relevant for this thesis. However, I 
found a pending case before the Stockholm Administrative Court, regarding direct allocations 
conformity with EU state aid regulation that was useful for this thesis.30 The applicant of the 
case encourages the court to ask the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter the Court of 
Justice) for a preliminary ruling regarding whether article 107 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (hereinafter TFEU) should be considered hindering municipalities 
from performing direct allocations in situations where the allocation results in transferring of 
the land and/or in situations where the allocation results in leasing of the land to the 
developer.31 Another useful database for this thesis was EUR-lex,32 where I have found EU 
case law concerning how to interpret EU state aid regulations. 
While searching for guidance on the Internet I have found two pieces of Commission 
guidelines concerning how transfer of land should be done in order to comply with article 107 
TFEU. Furthermore, I have found some books, for example European Union Law of State Aid 
written by Kelyn Bacon and European State Aid Law and Policy by Conor Quigley Q.C. that 
have been useful when considering the land allocation system’s compliance with EU state aid 
regulations. 																																																								
28 C. Caesar, Municipal land allocations: integrating planning and selection of developers while transferring 
public land for housing in Sweden, In Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, vol. 31 (2016), pp. 257–
275, at p. 273.	
29 https://zeteo.wolterskluwer.se/. 
30 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16.	
31 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 21, para. 5.1. 
32 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/. 
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When searching for material for this thesis there was no research to be found 
concerning expert valuations made by a third party compared to expert valuations made by 
municipalities themselves. Thus, I could not confirm whether the valuations differ when they 
are made by a third party compared to when municipalities make them, which is an aspect 
that is therefore excluded from my economic analysis in chapter 6. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that a party in a pending case, who has an interest in the outcome, initiated the data I 
found concerning price differences when land is transferred after direct allocations, compared 
to when land is transferred after tender allocations. The data still has some relevance as will 
be explained in chapter 3.3.1 but it would have been desirable to have some research on this 
subject from a neutral actor.   		
 
1.6 Method and Theory 
As a starting point I will use an interdisciplinary method in order to analyse relevant non-
judicial scientific data concerning the municipal land allocations system. An interdisciplinary 
method means analysing a problem not only by using knowledge from the discipline where 
the problem arises from but also from other types of disciplines.33 I will analyse economics 
and real estate science when investigating how municipalities perform land allocations 
(question 1). My findings will then serve as a basis when examining the possible extent of 
performing land allocations while still complying with competition law and acting 
economically efficient (question 2) and the framework concerning how land allocations 
should be performed (question 3).34 
Subsequently, I will use doctrinal analysis (rättsdogmatisk metod) as described by Jan 
Kleineman when processing the identified problems.35  I will use this method to perform my 
judicial analyses in chapter 3 and 5 by interpreting different legal sources, such as primary 
law, case law, preparatory works and literature, to analyse the identified problems. 
Preparatory works, such as legislative proposals, have high relevance in the Swedish legal 
system, but they may be challenged in situations of contrarious primary law. Swedish case 
law also has high relevance in interpreting primary law. However, in some situations, lower 
courts are not obliged to comply with case law from higher courts because it contravenes for 
example EU law, which is superior to national law.36 																																																								
33 F. Sunnemark & M. Åberg (red.), Tvärvetenskap: fält, perspektiv eller metod, Lund: Studentlitteratur (2004), 
p. 11.	
34 An independent expert valuation has to be done previous to a direct allocation, see chapter 5.3.1. 
35 J. Kleineman, Rättsdogmatisk metod, In Juridisk Metodlära, F. Korling & M. Zamboni (red.), Lund: 
Studentlitteratur (2014), p. 21.  
36 Kleineman (2014), pp. 32–33. 
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Additionally, I will use EU judicial method as described by J. Reichel, J. Hettne and I. 
Otken Eriksson when interpreting EU law for my judicial analyses in chapter 3 and 5. The EU 
legal sources consist of regulations, international agreements and general principles of law. 
Case law from the Court of Justice and the Tribunal generally has the same legal relevance as 
mentioned sources. Legal sources that are not binding but used as guidance of how to 
interpret EU law consist of recommendations and reports, preparatory works, literature, 
economic theories, and suggestions from advocate generals.37 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU has direct effect in member states and is 
superior in case of a conflict with national law.38 Therefore, articles 107–109 TFEU are of 
great importance when it comes to analysing problems of competition law concerning the 
Swedish land allocation system. In the CILFIT case the Court of Justice stated that provisions 
of EU law should always be interpreted in the light of the EU law as a whole, which is an 
aspect I will take into consideration in my concluding discussion (chapter 7.2).39  
General principles of EU law have a high relevance and meet three important functions; 
they fill in gaps in laws, they interpret secondary law and they constitute a baseline in order to 
define the validity of secondary law.40 There are several principles concerning what impact 
EU law has in member states. One important principle is, for example, the principle of sincere 
cooperation,41 which states that the EU and the member states shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks that flow from the Treaties. Member states have to 
undertake measures in order to fulfil their obligations and refrain from any measure, which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.42 Since the EU does not have an 
effective capability of carrying out their regulations, the principle of effet utile obliges 
member states to make sure EU law has uniform effect in all member states.43 
The Court of Justice plays an important role in the development and interpretation of 
EU law. The judgements from the Court of Justice have effect in all member states in the way 
that they provide them with guidance on how to interpret EU law. The Court of Justice 
considers itself having an obligation to take integration policies into consideration when 
judging, meaning that they judge in the light of the harmonious development of the EU. 
																																																								
37 J. Hettne & I. Otken Eriksson (red.), EU-rättslig metod: Teori och genomslag i svensk rättstillämpning, 
Second Edition, Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik (2011), pp. 40–41. 
38 Case 6/64, Costa v E.N.E.L., 15 July 1964, p. 218. 
39 Case 283/81, CILFIT, 6 October 1982, para. 20. 
40 J. Reichel, EU-rättslig metod, In Juridisk Metodlära, F. Korling & M. Zamboni (red.), Lund: Studentlitteratur 
(2014), p. 126.	
41 Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). 
42 Reichel (2014), p. 112–113.	
43 Reichel (2014), p. 112–113. 
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Judgements from the Court of Justice are sometimes designated to the lawmakers when the 
Court considers it necessary to change the legal position.44 
Another source of EU law that has attained a strong legal position is soft law, which 
consists of non-binding secondary law from EU administrative bodies, sometimes in 
cooperation with national bodies. These documents constitute clarifications, guidance etc., in 
order to facilitate a uniform interpretation of EU law and they have a strong position as a legal 
source when there is a lack of other guidance. The legal position of soft law results in member 
states not being the sole bodies of carrying out EU law and case law from the Court of Justice 
has also been complemented where necessary.45 In case Grimaldi the Court of Justice stated 
that national courts might be obligated to use soft law as basis of interpretation when it 
supports the interpretation of national regulation that is based on the soft law or when its 
purpose is to fill out gaps for binding EU regulation.46 The Commission has an important role 
when it comes to state aid: It is, for example, stated in the Treaties that the Commission shall 
review all situations of state aid in member states and, when necessary, decide that a measure 
shall be abrogated or changed.47 Consequently, soft law from the Commission in situations of 
state aid should be considered to have a high legal relevance. 
Moreover, I will use economic analysis of law as described by Vladimir Bastidas 
Venegas ,48 when performing the economic analyses in chapter 4 and 6. The method focuses 
on investigating economic efficiency, which means using economic resources in a way that 
promotes high economic welfare for all actors on the market.49 I will therefore analyse 
whether performing direct allocations means economic welfare for municipalities and 
developers or whether performing tender allocations would mean more economic welfare. I 
will also analyse whether the loose framework concerning how to perform land allocations 
means economic welfare for developers and municipalities or whether a stricter framework 
would provide more economic welfare.  
When performing an economic analysis of law I will do an external review of the land 
allocation system where the real purpose of the system is to have economic efficiency. There 
are two standard definitions concerning economic efficiency: Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency. Pareto efficiency aims to increase economic welfare for at least one actor on 
the market without decreasing the economic welfare for the other actor(s). Kaldor-Hicks 																																																								
44 Hettne & Otken Eriksson (2011), p. 60. 
45 Reichel (2014), p. 127–128.	
46 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 13 December 1989, para. 18. 
47 Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
48 V. Bastidas Venegas, Rättsekonomi, In Juridisk Metodlära, F. Korling & M. Zamboni (red.), Lund: 
Studentlitteratur (2014), pp. 175–205. 
49 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 176.	
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efficiency, on the other hand, aims to increase the total economic welfare meaning that the 
positive effects for one actor should outweigh the negative effects for the other actor(s) on the 
market. When applying economic analysis of law, I will use both positive analysis, which 
means I will analyse whether the land allocation system is economically efficient, and 
normative analysis, which means I will examine how the system should be, in order to 
promote more economic efficiency.50 
Furthermore, I will use the transaction cost theory, 51 in order to analyse whether the 
land allocation system promotes an efficient common market within the EU, or whether the 
system needs improvement in order to promote more economic efficiency. The transaction 
cost theory concerns how transaction costs affect the possibility to reach economic efficiency. 
Transaction costs include costs for finding a contract partner, negotiations and costs for 
executing the contract. It is also based on the idea that individuals have self-interests and 
limited rationality since they do not have all the necessary information to make optimal 
decisions.52 Transaction costs, in combination with a lack of information, can result in 
opportunistic behaviour, which means that individuals make short-term decisions that might 
result in negative consequences in the long run.53 According to the Coase theorem,54 a world 
without transaction costs would mean that the resources are allocated in the most efficient 
way, independently of how the rights are distributed between individuals. Without transaction 
costs there is no need for states to intervene, since there will be agreements on the market 
with the most economically efficient results.55 
By using the transaction cost theory in chapter 4, I am going to analyse the transaction 
costs for developers and municipalities when performing direct allocations and compare them 
with the transaction costs of performing tender allocations in order to examine what 
procedure provides the most economic welfare. In chapter 6, I am going to analyse the 
transactions costs that developers and municipalities meet with today’s loose framework 
compared to the transactions costs a stricter framework could mean in order to examine 
whether today’s framework provides more economic welfare than a stricter framework would 
do. When searching for materials for this thesis I did not find any previous research 
concerning data covering the transactions costs when performing land allocations. My 
investigation will therefore be of theoretical nature. 
																																																								
50 Bastidas Venegas (2014), pp. 176–177. 
51 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 187. 
52 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 187.	
53 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 187. 
54 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1–44.	
55 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 188.	
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The transaction cost theory has resulted in discussions about the proper choice of 
rights for individuals: A property rule gives the holder the right to stop the using of a utility, 
while a liability rule means a judge controls the transaction and gives the holder the right to 
reparation from the actor who uses a utility.56 In land allocation procedures a property rule 
would mean a possibility to stop the procedure when there are indications that it is unlawfully 
performed, while a liability rule would mean that the procedure can be carried out even 
though it seems unlawful but with the possibility to bring actions in court. In accordance with 
the Coase theorem, the choice between property and liability rules does not matter when there 
are no transaction costs. However, when dealing with transaction costs there is a need of 
making the most proper choice between the rules: With too high negotiation costs, the parties 
will not come to agreements with the most economically efficient results. In that event it 
might be more suitable to have a liability rule, which means there will be actions with lower 
transaction costs but a judge will decide on the matter in case of conflicts. Thus, I will take 
transaction costs into consideration in the concluding discussion (chapter 7.2) when analysing 
the available legal actions in situations where a land allocation is subject for dispute.57 
In conclusion, I will use an interdisciplinary method when analysing previous data 
concerning the land allocations system. Furthermore, I will analyse potential state aid 
problems in the light of doctrinal analysis and the EU judicial method described above. 
Moreover, I am going to analyse whether the land allocation system is motivated from an 
economic analysis of law perspective by using the transaction cost theory. And lastly, I will 
use my findings to analyse what adjustments are needed in order for the system to mean fewer 
problems of competition law while being economically efficient. 	  
																																																								
56 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 189.	
57 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 190. 
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2. Relevant Law 
This chapter will present relevant regulations that are to be used when applying doctrinal 
analysis and EU judicial method in this thesis. This chapter will only deal with the most 
frequently used regulations, which need to be presented in greater detail in order to better 
understand the following chapters. 
 
2.1 Swedish Law 
Act 2014:899 regulates the obligation for municipalities to adopt policies concerning land 
allocations if they are dealing with land allocation procedures. The legislative proposal for 
this act states that the legislation is meant to clarify the playing field for developers through 
clear and predictable evaluation criteria in municipal policies. It also states: “A land allocation 
policy may create transparency regarding developers’ possibilities to participate in land 
allocation procedures”.58 The lack of transparency was a clearly identified problem in the 
report by the Swedish Competition Authority from 2013, where developers submitted that the 
absence of uniformity resulted in lack of transparency.59    
Paragraph 1 of Act 2014:899 contains the definition of a land allocation, which is found 
in section 1.1.1 above. Paragraph 2 section 1 states how the guidelines should be formulated:
  
A municipality shall introduce policies regarding land allocations. The policies shall contain 
the municipality’s starting points and goals concerning transfer or leasing of land aimed for 
construction, administrative routines, and basic conditions concerning land allocations. They 
shall also contain principles regarding price-fixing.60  
 
 
From the wording of the paragraph, you cannot distinguish any guidance concerning what 
aspects municipalities are obliged to take into consideration while formulating their policies. 
However, there is some guidance in the legislative proposal. The legislative proposal states 
that municipalities have an obligation to make sure that the policy clarifies in what way the 
municipality intends to make sure that land areas are not sold below market price. That should 
be done in the light of the Swedish Kommunallag (SFS 1991:900) (Municipality law) and EU 
state aid regulations.61 The legislative proposal also states that municipal policies are aimed at 
being seen as indicative guidance, meaning that they are not binding for either the 
municipality or the developer. Municipalities are anyhow expected to act in compliance with 																																																								
58 Prop. 2013/14:126, En enklare planprocess. (Stockholm: Näringsdepartementet), p. 228. (Author’s own 
translation). 
59 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 10. 
60 SFS 2014:899, Lag om riktlinjer för kommunala markanvisningar, § 2 part 1. (Author’s own translation).	
61 Prop. 2013/14:126, p. 287.	
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their adopted policies. Municipalities are also obliged to adopt their policies before 
performing a land allocation, but the policy does not constitute a prerequisite for the 
agreement between the municipality and the developer in order to be valid. A performed land 
allocation, before any policies are adopted, is therefore to be considered valid.62  
 
2.2 EU Law 
The main purpose when formulating articles 107–109 TFEU was to prevent national 
economic rivalry from stifling the creation of a common market.63 Article 107(1) TFEU states 
that:  
 
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.64  
 
All of the criteria in the paragraph have to be met for the transaction to constitute illegal state 
aid.65 Articles 107(2) TFEU and 107(3) TFEU contain several examples of what constitutes 
legal state aid. Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, for example, states that it is allowed to provide “aid to 
facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where 
such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest”.66 
Article 108(1) TFEU states that the Commission shall, together with the member states, 
control the compliance with the state aid regulation by reviewing all systems of aid and 
propose appropriate measures for member states in order for them to comply with the rules. If 
the Commission finds that aid granted by a member state is not compatible with the common 
market, in accordance with article 107 TFEU, it shall abolish or alter such aid within a period 
of time determined by the Commission, in accordance with article 108(2) TFEU. Article 
108(3) TFEU is essential since it requires member states to inform the Commission “in 
sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid”. If the 
Commission considers such plans not compatible with the common market, in accordance 
with article 107 TFEU, it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in article 
																																																								
62 Prop. 2013/14:126, p. 287. 
63 Bacon (2013), p. 4. 
64 Article 107(1) TFEU.	
65 Madell & Lundberg (2008), p. 29.	
66 Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. 
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108(2) TFEU. Articles 108(4) and 109 TFEU regulate how the Council may adopt appropriate 
regulations concerning state aid, under certain conditions. 
Consequently, article 107 TFEU prohibits member states from financially supporting 
any company in situations where it distorts, or risks distorting, the competition and thus 
affects the trade within the common market. Such profits are prohibited irrespective of 
whether the fund derives from the state or a municipality; it should be considered prohibited 
as long as it derives from public funds. Illegal state aid does not solely include situations 
where public money is directly transferred to a company, but also situations of grants, loans 
with a favourable rent, selling of goods and land below market price etc. Article 107 TFEU is 
thus applicable in situations of municipal land transactions.67 
In order to confirm whether a transfer of land from a municipality to a 
company/developer constitutes illegal state aid in accordance with article 107 TFEU, the 
transfer should mean an economic benefit for the company that the company normally should 
not have received. Another criterion for article 107 TFEU to be applicable is that the transfer 
of land affects the competition within the common market.68  
The Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) (hereinafter the 
Commission Notice) is a guidance by the Commission with the aim to “provide further 
clarification on the key concepts relating to the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 
107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with a view to contributing to 
an easier, more transparent and more consistent application of this notion across the Union”.69 
Thus, the legal relevance of this Notice is high since it contributes to the interpretation of EU 
state aid regulations. National courts might even have an obligation to use the guidance 
provided by the Commission Notice as a basis of interpretation when ruling on state aid 
cases.70 
As defined in the Commission Notice, there are several acknowledged ways of 
determining whether a public transaction is made under market-oriented conditions. A 
transaction that follows (a) a bidding procedure, (b) which is exposed to competition, (c) 
transparent and (d) unconditional is generally to be considered made under market oriented 
conditions in accordance with the Commission Notice.71 
																																																								
67 Madell & Lundberg (2008), pp. 28–30. 
68 Madell & Lundberg (2008), pp. 28–30. 
69 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, In Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C 262 (2016), pp. 1–50, at p. 3. 
70 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 13 December 1989, para. 18.	
71 Commission Notice (2016), paras. 89–92. 
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However, if a transaction does not meet the requirements above for excluding state aid 
(a-d), it can be evaluated through different proceedings to preclude any elements of state aid. 
Transfer of land should then be evaluated through (a) an independent expert evaluation (b) 
prior to the sale negotiations to establish the market value and it should be (c) based on 
generally accepted market indicators and valuation standards.72 The Commission Notice does 
not clarify the conditions necessary for making a proper expert valuation. However, there is 
an abrogated Commission Communication from 1997 where the Commission provides more 
detailed information concerning how to perform an independent expert valuation. Regarding 
the criterion ‘independent’, the Commission Communication from 1997 follows: 
 
The valuer should be independent in the carrying out of his tasks, i.e. public 
authorities should not be entitled to issue orders as regards the result of the valuation. 
State valuation offices and public officers or employees are to be regarded as 
independent provided that undue influence on their findings is effectively excluded.73 
 
Despite the fact that this communication is no longer valid, I consider it has some relevance 
when determining whether an expert valuation is independent, since the Commission has not 
formulated any new definition of the concept ‘independent’. There is no guidance in case law 
or literature concerning the concept ‘independent’ and what the demarcation is between 
dependent and independent. Instead, there is case law that gives examples of when an expert 




72 Commission Notice (2016), para. 103. 
73 Commission Communication on State aid elements in sales of land and buildings by public authorities, In 
Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C 209 (1997), pp. 3–5, at p. 4. 
74 For example case T-253/12, Hammar Nordic Plugg v Commission, (not yet published). 
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3. Judicial Analysis of Direct Allocations  
In this chapter I am going to investigate how frequently direct allocations are performed in 
municipalities and how developers may receive them. I will furthermore analyse potential 
legal concerns that the use of direct allocations may cause and in what situations it is legally 
justifiable to perform direct allocation, i.e. to what extent they should be performed; both in 
relation to Swedish law an in relation to EU law. 
 
3.1 The Use of Direct Allocations in Municipalities 
Most municipalities use both tender and direct allocations, the choice between them 
depending on the specific situation. Nonetheless, direct allocation is a more commonly used 
method among 48% of the municipalities compared to tender allocation, which is the most 
commonly used method in 40% of the municipalities.75 The two methods are described to 
have different positive benefits; direct allocations may require fewer resources for the 
municipality because the developer often makes the planning and initiating of the project, 
which may create incitement for new, innovative solutions and proposals from developers. 
Performing tender allocations, however, is a more competitive way of distributing municipal-
owned land. 76  The Swedish Competition Authority believes that the competition must 
increase when deciding methods for distributing land allocations. Therefore, performing 
tender allocation should be the most commonly used method since it is similar to public 
procurement.77 Thus, despite the exhortation from the Swedish Competition Authority, most 
municipalities state that performing direct allocation is their most commonly used method 
when distributing land to developers. 
It is important for developers to have an established contact with officials of the 
municipality in order to receive land. Small businesses on the market rarely have this position 
and therefore feel that they are hindered to enter the market when municipalities use direct 
allocations as the primary method when distributing land to developers.78 In a survey targeted 
at developers from 2013, 75 out of 82 developers believed that it is essential to have good 
contacts with politicians in municipalities in order to receive land allocations. Moreover, 70 
out of 80 developers thought that previous completed projects are of importance in order to 
receive land allocations.79 Only 26 out of 80 questioned developers believed that the system 																																																								
75 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2015:5, p. 40. 
76 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, pp. 71–72.	
77 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 83. 
78 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind, (2013), pp. 66–67.	
79 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind, (2013), p. 66.	
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of land allocations in general is working well or mainly well and only 22 out of 82 developers 
affirmed that the system is transparent or mainly transparent.80 
The Swedish Competition Authority proposes, in a report from 2013, that there should 
be a requirement for municipalities to perform a certain portion of land allocations as tender 
procedures. They state in the same report that land allocation procedures have similarities to 
public procurement and it is therefore suitable to develop a regulatory framework similar to 
the procurement rules.81 
 
3.2 Swedish Law 
3.2.1 The Planning and Building Act 
In accordance with the Planning and Building Act (Plan- och Bygglagen) (SFS 2010:900), 
planning of land and water is a municipality matter. This matter is called the municipality 
planning monopoly and concerns the sole right for municipalities to adopt plans for how the 
land and water within the municipality should be exploited.82 Municipalities have a wide 
leeway for deciding how to design a detailed development plan. They may, for example, 
decide (1) the extent of the development above and below the ground, (2) the use of buildings, 
and (3) the proportion of apartments of different types in residential buildings and the size of 
the apartments.83 Thus, municipalities may legitimize their use of direct allocations by 
referring to their interests and right to deciding how their land should be exploited. 
3.2.2 Act 2014:899 
Act 2014:899 concerns the obligation for municipalities, who perform land allocations, to 
adopt policies for the procedure. The act does not state anything concerning to what extent 
allocations should be done through tender allocations. Accordingly, it is up to municipalities 
to decide whether their policies should include principles concerning to what extent 
allocations should be done through a tender procedure. However, even if municipalities were 
to adopt policies stating that they should perform tender allocations to a certain extent or in 
certain situations, they are not obliged to observe their own policies, since land allocation 
agreements are valid even when they go beyond the municipalities’ policies84 Thus, according 
to Act 2014:899, there are no restrictions for municipalities to perform direct allocations.     																																																								
80 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind, (2013), p. 65.	
81 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, pp. 84–85. 
82 L. U. Didón, L. Magnusson, S. Molander, C. Adolfsson & J. Hjalmarsson, Plan- och bygglag (2010:900), 
Zeteo (2016), comment to 1 kap. 2 §. 
83 SFS 2010:900, Plan- och bygglag, chapter 4 § 11. 
84 Prop. 2013/14:126, p. 287.	
	 21	
3.2.3 Legality Procedure 
Decisions concerning detailed development plans and land allocations may only be reviewed 
through a legality procedure (laglighetsprövning), which means that the suitability of a 
decision will not be reviewed. Rather the only issues subject to review are whether: (1) the 
decision was made through an unlawful procedure, (2) the decision does not concern a 
municipal matter, (3) the decision maker has overstepped her/his authority, or (4) the decision 
goes against the law. Each member of a municipality has the right to try and override 
decisions concerning detailed development plans and land allocations. The decision cannot be 
changed but only repealed.85  
Consequently, the Swedish regulations do not give any guidance or limitations 
concerning the choice of land allocation procedures. Instead, the regulation provides 
municipalities with a large margin of discretion when making decisions concerning how land 
should be exploited and what procedure they should use in order to choose a developer for the 
land. The available tool for reviewing whether decisions concerning detailed development 
plans and land allocations implies state aid constitutes that members of municipalities apply 
for a repeal of the decision, but without any possibilities to receive compensation or to change 
the decisions. 
3.2.4 The Åre Case 
The Åre case – a case from the Swedish Administrative Court of Second Instance – is a case 
law that provides guidance concerning the relation between transfer of land and state aid that 
both the Commission and the Tribunal have examined. The applicant of the case submits that 
a decision, made by Åre municipality, shall be abrogated since it includes state aid. The 
decision concerned transfer of land from Åre municipality to Konsum (a grocery store) to the 
price of 2 000 000 SEK, although Lidl (another grocery store) offered a price of 6 600 000 
SEK.86 
The Administrative Court of First Instance ruled that the affair did not include any 
element of state aid since Lidl’s bid arrived just before the decision was made. Another 
argument for excluding state aid was that the Court considered the price of 2 000 000 SEK 
not falling below market price “in a decisive way”,87 because the affair was motivated as part 
of the development of Åre city centre. 
Before the Administrative Court of Second Instance brought up the case, the 
Commission issued a decision on the matter, with the focus of determining the market price of 																																																								
85 SFS 2010:900, Plan- och bygglag, chapter 13 § 1 & SFS 1991:900, Kommunallag, chapter 10. 
86 Länsrätten i Jämtlands Län, case 791-05 (24 May 2006), p. 1–2. 
87 Länsrätten i Jämtlands Län, case 791-05 (24 May 2006), p. 5. 
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the land. The Commission decided that Lidl’s bid on the land should constitute the market 
price rather than the independent expert valuation, and therefore, the decision to set the price 
to 2 000 000 SEK was considered constituting state aid.88 The submission from the defendant, 
that Lidl would not be able to meet the requirements of the detailed development plan, did not 
affect the decision. Consequently, the Swedish Administrative Court of Second Instance 
declared the decision abrogated.89  
The Swedish Administrative Court of Second Instance did not (and may not) consider 
whether the municipality should have transferred the land through a tender procedure instead 
of a direct procedure, since the case is ruled through a legality procedure.90 But we can draw 
some conclusions from the judgement: The direct procedure, concerning transferring the land 
to Konsum at the price of 2 000 000 SEK, was considered incorrect even though it followed 
an expert valuation since there was a higher bid on the land that was considered representing 
the market price. From the reasoning by the Commission, which was the basis of the 
judgement by the Swedish Administrative Court of Second Instance, it is reasonable to draw 
the conclusion that a higher bid that arrives from a third party in a direct procedure could stop 
the procedure. 
However, Åre municipality appealed the decision to the Tribunal, which invalidated the 
decision to abrogate Åre municipality’s decision since the Commission did not take all 
relevant circumstances that were brought up by Åre municipality into consideration. 
Therefore, the bid by Lidl was considered not comparable to the actual market price for the 
land. Thus, the Commission had wrongfully overvalued the fact that Lidl arrived with a 
higher bid for the land. Consequently, a higher bid does not hinder a direct procedure when 
there are circumstances that make the higher bid not reflective of the market price.91 Arguing 
by analogy could mean that situations of direct procedures, where there are no specific 
circumstances that are only achievable for a specific developer, could oblige municipalities to 
observe a higher bid that arrives and accordingly hinder the direct procedure.  
 
																																																								
88 State Aid – Sweden: State aid C 35/2006 (ex NN 37/2006) – Sale of land below market price Invitation to 
submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, In Official Journal of the European Communities, 
no. C 204 (2006), pp. 5–7, paras. 18–20. 
89 Kammarrätten i Sundsvall, case 1715-06 (9 April 2008), p. 5–7. 
90 SFS 1991:900, Kommunallag, chapter 10 § 8. 
91 Case T-244/08, COOP Nord v Commission, (13 December 2011), paras. 66–77.	
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3.3 EU Law 
3.3.1 Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU includes four criteria that have to be 
met in order for a transaction to constitute state aid. The first criterion stresses that aid should 
be granted by a member state in order for it to be unallowable. As clarified from case law, the 
concept ‘aid’ refers to benefits directly from a member state or through a public or private 
body.92 The benefit should mean an economic advantage that the recipient would not have 
received under normal market conditions and the measure must entail an actual or potential 
use of public resources including loss to the State budget.93 Only the effect of the action is 
relevant when considering whether the action means a benefit to the actor on the market. No 
consideration should therefore be taken regarding the reason or purpose of the action.94  
Municipalities, which are public bodies using public resources, perform land allocations 
that put developers in beneficial situations since they have the sole right to negotiate with 
municipalities about how the land should be exploited, and thereby have the exclusive chance 
of buying the land.95 Today’s extent of performing direct allocations favours a small number 
of large developers, who have been dominating the market for several years, which means 
that few strong actors on the market benefit from the system.96  
There are indications that developers who receive land allocations through a direct 
procedure get to pay a lower price for the land than would have been the case if they received 
the land through a tender procedure. In a summary by Botrygg AB, in a pending case before 
the Stockholm Court of Administration, some comparisons are made between Stockholm 
municipality, who mainly perform direct allocations and nearby municipalities, who mainly 
perform tender allocations.97 The summary demonstrates that there is a wider price difference 
between the price for transferring land after a direct allocation in Stockholm and the price (per 
square metres) for such apartments when sold to consumers, compared to the price for 
transferring land after a tender allocation in nearby municipalities and the price (per square 
metres) for such apartments when sold to consumers.98 The same applies to leasing of land.99 
Thus, a piece of land in Stockholm municipality, where you can buy an apartment for a 																																																								
92 See for example Cases C-72-73/91, Sloman Neptun Schiffarts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer (17 March 
1993), para 19; C-189/91, Kirsammer-Hack v Sidal (30 November 1993), para 16; C-379/98 Preussen Electra 
AG v Schleswag AG (13 Marsh 2001), para 58. 
93 Bacon (2013), p. 12. 
94 Case 173/73 Italy v Commission (2 July 1974), para. 13. 
95 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 35. 
96 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 49. 
97 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 26, p. 2. 
98 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 26, p. 2.	
99 See chapter 7.3 for suggestions for further research.	
	 24	
specific price per square metres, was transferred for a lower price through direct allocation 
than a piece of land in a nearby municipality, transferred through tender allocation, that 
provides apartments for the same price.  
When analysing the result from the summary one should take into consideration that the 
summary is produced by the applicant of the case, who has an interest in presenting this result 
since it supports their case. Another aspect is that the summary only comprises a limited part 
of the municipalities in the country and there might be other relevant aspects, connected to 
these specific municipalities that should have been taken into consideration. Still, the 
summary indicates that there could be an economic advantage for developers that receive land 
through direct allocations.100  
It could be motivated to transfer land through direct allocations in Stockholm 
municipality to lower prices than in nearby municipalities, if the prices are to be considered as 
market prices. However, from reading the Commission’s decision in the Åre case, the highest 
bid for a piece of land should principally be considered the market price,101 which is an 
argument that was not per se questioned by the Tribunal in the later judgement. 102 
Furthermore, in the Commission Notice it is stated that one can be sure that the land is 
transferred through market oriented conditions when it is made through a tender procedure.103 
Moreover, in a report by the Swedish Competition Authority it is stated that it is not possible 
to with certainty determine the market price for land without performing a tender 
allocation.104 Thus, it is more likely that Stockholm municipality, when performing direct 
allocations, should set the price to the same price level as comparable pieces of lands in the 
nearby municipalities, in order to act market oriented. The economic advantages that 
developers seem to receive through direct allocations in Stockholm municipality are therefore 
probably not motivated since they should not be considered constituting the market prices. 
Taking this indication – that developers who receive land trough direct allocations have an 
economic advantage – into consideration, performing direct allocations without restrictions 
could be problematic according to the first criterion in article 107(1) TFEU.  
The second criterion when investigating unallowable state aid concerns that the aid 
should distort or threaten to distort competition. The aid should be considered distorting or 
threatening to distort competition when there is a risk that it improves the recipient’s 
competition position in relation to other competitors. It is enough that the aid makes it 																																																								
100 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 26, p. 2. 
101 State Aid (2006), paras. 18–20. 
102 Case T-244/08, COOP Nord v Commission (13 December 2011). 
103 Commission Notice (2016), para. 84. 
104 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 73. 
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possible for an actor to maintain it’s position as a strong competitor on the market – it is not 
required that the aid means a larger market share for the actor. The aid that distorts or 
threatens to distort competition does not have to be significant or crucial, but it should not just 
be hypothetical.105 
As mentioned, today’s extent of performing direct allocations favours a few large 
developers, who have been dominating the market for several years, which means few strong 
actors on the market benefit from the system.106 The advantage that is presented by Botrygg 
AB in their summary is not hypothetical but presents an actual distortion of the 
competition.107 Thus, the second criterion in article 107(1) TFEU could mean a problem when 
performing direct allocations without restrictions. 
The third criterion concerns the requirement for the aid to favour certain undertakings or 
the producer of certain goods in order for the aid to constitute unallowable state aid. This 
means that the aid should relate to particular undertakings or to a particular type of product. In 
other words, situations of general fiscal and economic measures do not constitute state aid.108 
The measure of using direct allocations is related to a particular undertaking; it relates to 
situations of negotiations about how to exploit municipal-owned land before they are sold or 
leased to a developer. Therefore, aid through direct allocations should meet the third criterion 
in article 107(1) TFEU.109 
The fourth criterion concerns that the aid should affect trade between member states in 
order for it to be unallowable. Transfer of land from a municipality to a developer for 
exploitation affects the common market since foreign actors exist on the market, and the 
fourth criterion in article 107(1) TFEU is therefore met.110 
Consequently, there are indications that direct allocations could mean economic 
advantages for developers and therefore constitute state aid. However, it is questionable 
whether direct allocations cause any economic benefits for developers because it is reasonably 
difficult to draw clear conclusions from comparisons between land that is transferred through 
tender allocation and land that is transferred through direct allocations, since all pieces of land 
are unique. But there are indications of economic advantages for developers who receive land 
through direct allocations, which ought to mean there is at least a risk for economic 
benefits.111 Thus, performing direct allocations without restrictions could be considered to 																																																								
105 Commission Notice (2016), paras. 187–189.	
106 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 49. 
107 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 26, p. 2. 
108 Bacon (2013), p. 12. 
109 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 35–36. 
110 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 50. 
111 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 26, p. 2. 
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threaten to distort competition within the common market, which is enough in order to affirm 
unallowable state aid.112 Considering the indication that direct allocations could threaten to 
distort competition in the light of the Commission’s decision in the Åre case and the later 
judgement by the Tribunal could mean that performing direct allocations threatens to distort 
competition when there are no particular circumstances that make a sole developer suitable 
for exploiting the land. 
3.3.2 State Aid as an Instrument in Case of Market Failure 
State aid is not always unallowed, but can be an important instrument for governments to 
intervene in the economy of the state. It can create benefits for the national economy by, for 
example, improving efficiency when the market fails to deliver an optimal economic 
outcome. The market sometimes fails to provide the optimal level of goods and services and 
state aid can therefore be necessary in order to improve economic welfare. 113  Many 
municipalities in Sweden are failing in the task of providing enough housing to the citizens, 
which could be considered a market failure where state intervention is justifiable.114 State aid 
through direct allocation could therefore be acceptable as a much faster procedure than 
performing tender allocations in order to solve the market failure of housing shortage more 
efficiently. Performing direct allocations is a way to attract serious developers that are willing 
to build new apartments, and thereby facilitate the housing shortages in municipalities, since 
the developers can afford setting off more resources to the project when they know they have 
the sole right to negotiate and later to buy the land.115 Performing direct allocations is also a 
way to economize municipality resources since the procedure is faster than a tender allocation 
and the municipality rarely has to find the developer and put effort in performing a detailed 
development plan.116  
However, in order for state aid to be legally justifiable, it must fall within one of the 
exceptions in articles 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU. As concerns articles 107(2) and 107(3) 
TFEU, regarding situations when aid shall be or may be compatible with the common market, 
aid through direct allocations could only possibly fall under article 107(3)(c) TFEU according 
to the wording of the paragraphs. Article 107(3) TFEU concerns aid that is aimed to achieve 
an objective of common interest and 107(3)(c) focuses on the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas.117 The building of new housing for citizens 																																																								
112 Article 107(1) TFEU. 
113 Bacon (2013), p. 7. 
114 Bacon (2013), p. 8. 
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could be such common interest that falls under “certain economic area”. However, article 
107(3)(c) TFEU only allows aid to promote the development of economic areas or activities 
in a given sector; the aid should not promote the position of a few actors operating in the 
sector. Performing direct allocations without restrictions can therefore not be legitimized 
under article 107(3)(c).118  
 
3.4 Conclusions from Chapter 3 
The conclusions that can be drawn from chapter 3 include that Swedish law allows for 
municipalities to perform direct allocations without restrictions. However, the judgement in 
the Åre case could mean that municipalities have to observe a higher bid that arrives in a 
direct procedure.  
Furthermore, direct allocations could mean economic advantages for developers who 
receive them and might therefore be problematic in relation to article 107(1) TFEU. There are 




118 C. Quigley Q. C., European State Aid Law and Policy, Second Edition, Portland: Hart Publishing (2009), p. 
137. 
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4. Economic Analysis of Direct Allocations 
Even though performing direct allocations without restrictions may seem questionable in 
relation to EU state aid regulations, it might be favourable by providing economic efficiency 
to the common market. As mentioned in section 1.6 above, economic efficiency can be 
defined in two different ways: 1. Pareto efficiency, which aims to increase economic welfare 
for at least one actor on the market without decreasing the economic welfare for the other 
actor(s) and: 2. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which aims to increase the total economic welfare 
meaning that the positive effects for one actor should outweigh the negative effects for the 
other actor(s) on the market. The transaction costs theory states in general that transaction 
costs combined with a lack of information affect the possibilities to reach economic 
efficiency.119 I will further in this section analyse whether performing direct allocations 
provides the market with more economic efficiency or whether tender allocation might 
provide more economic efficiency in some situations by using the transaction cost theory.  
There are indications that municipalities lose financially when performing direct 
allocations, since the price for the land could have been higher by performing tender 
allocation.120 Despite this, municipalities still mainly perform direct allocations, which means 
less transaction costs when distributing land to developers. The transaction costs when 
performing tender allocations are higher for municipalities since they, for example, have to 
establish how they want to exploit the land and then compare and analyse the offers.121 Thus, 
there are indications that the transaction costs are lower for municipalities when performing 
direct allocations and it is not clear that the possible higher price for the land, when 
performing tender allocations, would mean more economic welfare. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to suppose that municipalities decide to perform a plurality of direct allocations 
since they do not have all necessary information in order to foresee what a tender allocation 
would lead to, and they are not willing to find that out by taking the risk of having high 
transaction costs. This could be an opportunistic behaviour that might not generate the most 
economic welfare but might be favourable in the short run: municipalities make fast affairs 
with developers that they have a relationship to and trust in.122 Thus, direct allocations might 
lead to more economic welfare for municipalities, since the transaction costs are higher when 
performing tender allocations, but it is unclear whether the transaction costs outweigh the 
financial loss when transferring the land. 																																																								
119 See chapter 1.6 above. 
120 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, pending case 22781-16, case file 26, p. 2. 
121 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 85–86.	
122 ’Opportunistic behaviour’ is described in chapter 1.6 above. 
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When considering whether performing direct allocations means economic welfare for 
the counterpart it has to be considered that there is a big difference in how developers are 
affected by the system. As mentioned above, few big developers are favoured by the system 
since they dominate the land allocation market.123 Thus, small developers are disadvantaged 
when municipalities perform direct allocation. However, the big developers, who receive 
direct allocations, have transaction costs when convincing municipalities that they are suitable 
developers: Those costs are called ‘influence costs’ and are difficult to calculate but might be 
significant.124 Developers who do not receive direct allocations have obviously no transaction 
costs. However, performing direct allocations hinders small developers to enter the market 
and the plurality of developers does not receive as many allocations as they would like. 
Performing tender allocations also means transaction costs for developers, but they are 
probably less significant since municipalities have allocated resources to specify what they 
are looking for and how the selection will be made, which is therefore not for the developers 
to find out. Therefore, developers do not need to allocate as much recourses to ‘influence 
costs’ and more developers will have the chance to access the market.125 Accordingly, most 
developers on the market are disadvantaged by the unlimited use of direct allocations and the 
economic welfare for developers overall is therefore to be considered low. 
Consequently, performing direct allocations without restrictions means low economic 
welfare for developers but could mean more economic welfare for municipalities. However, 
the potential welfare for municipalities is not significant and the system is therefore unlikely 
to provide the best possible solution for receiving economic efficiency. Since performing 
tender allocations seems to mean lower transactions costs for developers, I will analyse 
whether performing tender allocations instead of direct allocations is likely to lead to more 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or Pareto efficiency. 
From reading the Commissions decision in the Åre case and the later judgement by the 
Tribunal, there seem to be situations where a direct allocation can be legally justified, even 
though another actor has arrived with a higher bid, since there are circumstances that make 
only one actor suitable for receiving the land allocation.126 I will call these situations ‘complex 
situations’ compared to ‘ordinary situations’ where there are no specific circumstances, 
which means that more than one actor is suitable to receive the land allocation.  
																																																								
123 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 49. 
124 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 85. 
125 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 85–86. 
126 State Aid (2006), pp. 5–7 & Case T-244/08, COOP Nord v Commission (13 December 2011). 
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Developers mostly initiate direct allocations.127 However, if only tender allocations 
were allowed it would be less reasonable for developers to initiate projects since few 
developers would take the risk to allocate resources to influence costs if they were not quite 
sure of receiving the land. My economic analysis below – concerning only performing tender 
allocations and not direct allocations – will therefore assume that only municipalities initiate 
projects. It is, however, reasonable to believe that there would be developers who try to 
influence municipalities to perform a land allocation when they are interested in exploiting a 
land area. Even though the analysis will assume that only municipalities initiate projects it 
will still distinguish complex situations from ordinary situations. 
When developers initiate land allocations today they often present well elaborated 
suggestions for how the land should be exploited, which means that municipalities have not 
come up with the idea concerning how the land should be exploited.128 In those situations – 
when municipalities have few preferences concerning how land should be exploited – the land 
may still be distributed trough tender allocations. There are, for example, possibilities for 
municipalities to perform tender competition and let developers present creative solutions for 
how to exploit the land.129 In situations where municipalities, on the other hand, have 
preferences for how land should be exploited they may perform tender allocations with set 
criteria for what they expect from the developer. Both situations – when municipalities have 
preferences and when they have few preferences – may be included in ordinary situations 
when there are possibilities for many developers to arrive with bids. 
It is likely that both municipalities and developers would gain in economic welfare 
status in ordinary situations if they were performed through tender allocations. The 
transaction costs for municipalities would probably increase compared to performance of 
direct allocations, but more developers would have the possibility to access the market and 
municipalities would therefore probably receive the highest possible price for the land: In 
ordinary situations more developers are suitable for exploiting the land, which should lead to 
more tenders and consequently a higher market price. The transaction costs for developers 
would probably decrease in ordinary situations since they would have less ‘influence costs’. 
Developers could meet high ‘influence costs’ if the number of tender competitions increased 
but there would probably still be enough tender allocations with set criteria that developers 
can choose to bid on. Using tender allocations in ordinary situations would therefore probably 
lead to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but, if not so, at least to Pareto efficiency. 																																																								
127 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 70. 
128 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 70.	
129 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 98.	
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In complex situations the economic welfare for municipalities would reasonably 
decrease if they performed more tender allocations. In complex situations more municipal 
resources would be required when performing tender allocations since there are specific 
circumstances that need to be specified before commencing the performance in order to avoid 
offers from unsuitable developers. Such specific circumstances could be, for example, like the 
ones in the Åre case where a development of the city planning meant that the municipality had 
to give the land allocation to a specific developer in order to fulfil the city planning 
development.130 Municipalities would therefore meet high transaction costs in terms of 
preparation costs and costs for reviewing potential received offers that do not arise in direct 
procedures. Performing tender allocations could therefore mean unnecessary administrative 
work for municipalities since they would have to justify their choice of developer to a greater 
extent than in direct procedures. The transaction costs should also be higher for developers in 
complex situations since there is a risk that unsuitable developers arrive with offers, when the 
municipality in fact already has decided on a suitable developer. It would probably not open 
up for more developers to access the market since most of them do not meet the specific 
requirements. 
Consequently, performing tender allocations in complex situations would probably 
mean decreased welfare for both developers and municipalities and could also mean less 
innovative solutions since there would be a lack of incentives for developers to allocate 
recourses to develop innovative detailed development plans when they cannot be quite sure of 
receiving the land allocation. Performing tender allocations in complex situations would 
therefore not lead to more economic efficiency but rather to the opposite. However, the 
concept complex situations is very diffuse and there are probably situations that fall between 
ordinary situations and complex situations. Still, a suitable way to achieve more economic 
efficiency than today’s situation could be to limit the use of direct allocations to complex 
situations.  	 	
																																																								
130 Länsrätten i Jämtlands Län, case 791-05 (24 May 2006), p. 2–3. 
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5. Judicial Analysis of the Land Allocation Framework 
From chapter 3 and 4 I have found that it could be problematic, in relation to EU state aid 
regulations, to perform direct allocations in ordinary situations but it seems unproblematic in 
complex situations. There are also indications of more economic efficiency when performing 
direct allocations in complex situations compared to ordinary situations where it seems less 
economically efficient. When the focus in chapters 3 and 4 was to examine whether 
performing direct allocations could be problematic in relation to Swedish and EU law and to 
what extent municipalities should performing direct allocations, i.e. in what situations it could 
be justified – both legally and economically – the following chapter will focus on examining 
the framework for how to perform land allocations and whether that framework is sufficiently 
well designed in order to promote economic efficiency.  
 
5.1 What Requirements Do Developers Meet in Land Allocation 
Procedures? 
In 2013 many developers complained about the lack of transparency in land allocation 
processes since each municipality had their own kind of system, which lead to 
unpredictability.131 These statements were made before Act 2014:899 was introduced and, 
despite there being no requirement to adopt land allocation policies, the developers felt the 
same unpredictability when doing business with municipalities that voluntarily provided land 
allocation policies: The unpredictability derived from the lack of uniformity.132 Furthermore, 
in 2013 the Swedish Competition Authority indicated that introducing a regulation that forces 
municipalities to adopt land allocation policies might not be enough to make the system 
efficient, since several municipalities that already had established policies did not comply 
with them.133 After Act 2014:899 was introduced, developers still met diverse criteria from 
different municipalities in order to receive a land allocation.134 
Moreover, land allocation agreements between municipalities and developers contain 
both specific conditions, which are decided for each individual construction project, and 
general conditions, which must be stated in the municipality’s land allocation policy.135 The 
general conditions, however, can be divided into two categories: formal and informal 
conditions. The formal conditions concern, for example, the time limit for land allocations, 																																																								
131 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 73. 
132 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 74–76. 
133 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 79. 
134 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2015:5, p. 42–43. 
135 SFS 2014:899, Lag om riktlinjer för kommunala markanvisningar.	
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under what conditions a municipality may revoke a land allocation and possibilities for 
developers to transfer land allocations. Informal conditions, on the other hand, are not stated 
in the land allocation policy but are of implicit nature and may include conditions such as 
expectation to accept a poorer land area before having a chance to compete for the attractive 
ones. Consequently, in order to have a chance to receive a direct allocation, developers 
sometimes need to accept informal conditions, which are not stated in the land allocation 
policy.136  
 
5.2 Swedish Law 
5.2.1 Act 2014:899 
As mentioned above, the criteria and terms that developers have to meet in order to receive a 
land allocation varies between different municipalities. Act 2014:899 § 2 states that a 
municipality that performs land allocations shall adopt a land allocation policy. The paragraph 
further provides that a policy should contain: (1) Starting points and goals for transactions or 
plots of land areas for exploitation, (2) processing routines and basic conditions for land 
allocations and (3) principles for land pricing.137  
The first point concerns the allocation of costs in order to perform the detailed 
development plan and other circumstances that are important when reaching an agreement 
concerning transferring or leasing of land. The second point concerns how municipalities 
intend to deal with declarations of interest, how they make decisions to allocate land, what 
requirements that need to be met and something about the municipalities’ assessment criteria. 
The last point requires municipalities to specify how they intend to make sure that no land is 
transferred below market price in accordance with EU state aid regulations.138 Accordingly, 
the act states that municipalities are required to adopt land allocation policies and assigns 
what the policies should include. However it does not give any guidance concerning how 
municipalities should design their policies. The legislative proposal states that the general 
purpose of the law is to create transparency and increased intelligibility in the beginning of 
the process when land is being transferred from municipalities to developers.139 As mentioned 
above, developers seek uniformity among municipalities in order to have more transparency. 
The act does not, however, include any regulation concerning a uniform land allocation 
process among municipalities. As mentioned in chapter 3, municipalities are obliged to 																																																								
136 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 39–40. 
137 SFS 2014:899, Lag om riktlinjer för kommunala markanvisningar. 
138 Prop. 2013/14:126, p. 287. 
139 Prop. 2013/14:126, p. 229.	
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perform land allocations in accordance with their policies but meet no sanctions if failing to 
do so. They should establish policies before performing any land allocation but the policy is 
no prerequisite to perform land allocations.140 
Consequently, the act provides plenty of room for municipalities to formulate their land 
allocation policies as far as they act within Swedish and EU law. However, municipalities 
meet no sanctions when they act against their own policies. Act 2014:899 should therefore be 
considered a loose framework for developers to act within when making land allocation 
businesses.  
5.2.2 Legality Procedure 
As mentioned in section 3.2.3, a decision to perform a land allocation with a certain developer 
can be challenged through a legality procedure in accordance with the Swedish Municipality 
Law (SFS 1991:900) chapter 10, which means that the decision cannot be changed but only 
revoked. The same applies for decision to adopt a land allocation policy. The appeal must be 
made no later than three weeks after the decision has been announced on the municipality's 
notice board.141 After that date, the policy cannot be challenge through a legality procedure 
but only decisions based on the policy. The possibilities to challenged land allocation 
decisions and policies through legality procedures will be further discussed in chapter 7.2. 
 
5.3 EU Law 
5.3.1 Commission Notice 
In accordance with the Commission Notice concerning article 107(1) TFEU, there are two 
ways of transferring state-owned land to developers, in a way that is obviously market-
oriented: either trough a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional 
tender procedure, or by performing an independent expert valuation.142 Thus, the Commission 
Notice allows for municipalities to perform tender allocations and direct allocations but they 
can only be considered obviously market-oriented as long as they meet the criteria for the 
respective procedure. 
Regarding tender allocation, the first requirement states that the procedure should be 
competitive, meaning that it should be possible for all interested, qualified developers to 
participate in the procedure. There are no indications that developers are excluded from 
participating in tender procedures in Swedish municipalities today. However, municipalities 																																																								
140 Prop. 2013/14:126, p. 287. 
141 SFS 1991:900, Kommunallag, chapter 10 § 6. 
142 Commission Notice (2016), paras. 89–92 & 103.	
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might have problems in meeting the other criteria in the Commission Notice in order to have 
marketable procedures. The second criterion from the Commission Notice – transparency – 
means that all interested tenders should be equally and duly informed about each phase in the 
process. The tenders should be provided with enough time to act, clear information about 
selection criteria and all necessary factors in the process.143 As mentioned above, many 
developers consider the land allocation system in Sweden non-transparent since 
municipalities have adopted policies with requirements that differ from each other and do not 
always comply with their own policies, which makes it difficult for developers to foresee how 
to act in order to receive a land allocation.144 Furthermore, the informal conditions, which are 
not stated in land allocation policies, also make it difficult to foresee land allocation processes 
and contributes to non-transparency.145 Thus, the Swedish regulation (act 2014:899) does not 
oblige municipalities to act transparently in their land allocation processes since there are no 
reprisals when they do not comply with their own policies, which seems problematic for 
developers who experience unpredictability when applying for a land allocation. 
Transparency is a criterion formulated to hinder that land allocations are performed in a non-
market-oriented way and the Swedish system may therefore be problematic in relation to EU 
state aid regulations.  
The third criterion in the Commission Notice – non-discriminatory treatment – means 
that all tenders should be treated equally and that the selection and allocation criteria are 
objective.146 Municipalities’ use of informal conditions might be problematic when it comes 
to non-discriminatory treatment. One observed informal condition concerns that developers 
have to accept poorer land areas before having the chance to receive a more attractive one. 
The knowledge about informal conditions should probably be less established among new, 
inexperienced developers, who therefore could be discriminated in land allocation 
processes.147 The fourth criterion – unconditional – means that receivers of land allocations 
should have full liberty to use the land for their own purpose in order for the procedure to be 
obviously market-oriented. The idea of land allocations is that municipalities develop a 
detailed development plan together with the developer of the land, meaning that the fourth 
criterion cannot be met in land allocation procedures. 148  However, tender allocation 
procedures could nonetheless be considered not market-oriented since the criteria in the 
Commission Notice only gives guidance concerning how to be sure transactions of state-																																																								
143 Commission Notice (2016), para. 91. 
144 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2013:10, p. 76. 
145 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 39–40. 
146 Commission Notice (2016), para. 92. 
147 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 39. 
148 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 46–47.  	
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owned property are market-oriented. It could possibly be a problem of competition law to 
perform tender allocations if the conditions established by the municipality are designed so 
that only a specific developer can meet them. 
The alternative way (that should be used for direct allocations) of transferring state-
owned land in a way that is obviously market-oriented requires municipalities to perform an 
independent expert valuation before the land is transferred. Independent expert valuations 
should be made before negotiations about transferring the land in order to establish the market 
price for the land, on the basis of generally accepted market indicators and valuation 
standards.149 The criterion ‘independent’ is not further developed in the notice. However, the 
abrogated communication from 1997 provides more information regarding the criterion 
‘independent’. The information is cited in section 2.2 above and states that Member State 
organs should preferably avoid making valuations of state-owned land that is aimed at being 
transferred to developers, in order to be sure the valuation is independent and, accordingly, 
that the transfer is market-oriented.150 There is no previous research that has charted how 
municipalities perform independent expert valuations. I will therefore examine what room 
there is to perform independent expert valuations. With lack of further guidance in primary 
law and soft law, I have to look to case law and general principles of EU law. The following 
section of chapter 5.3 will therefore deal with case law and EU principles in order to examine 
the room for performing independent expert valuations. 
5.3.2 Case Law Regarding ‘Independent’ 
In case T-253/12 the Tribunal considered the expert valuation independent since it was made 
(a) before the negotiations, (b) by a third party (c) that was independent in relation to both 
seller and buyer and (d) the valuer had good experience from real estate business. The 
Tribunal argued that the valuation was correctly performed since a consultant, who was 
considered not having a conflict of interests, made it and it was therefore evident that the 
expert valuation was independent.151 However, no demarcation was made of what should be 
considered an independent expert valuation since the court only argued that it was evident in 
this specific case that the expert valuation was independent. The only conclusion that can be 
drawn is that an expert valuation is to be considered independent when a third party, that has 
no conflict of interests, makes it. 
There is no EU case law to be found concerning ‘independent expert valuation’ in 
situations where a body of the state has made the valuation. However, the Swedish case 																																																								
149 Commission Notice (2016), para. 103. 
150 Commission Communication (1997), p. 4.	
151 Case T-253/12, Hammar Nordic Plugg v Commission, (not yet published), para. 44. 
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37589-10,152 ruled by the Stockholm Primary Court of Administration, deals with the concept 
‘independent expert valuation’ when the valuation was made by a body of the state. The case 
is referred to by the defendant in the pending case no 22781-16 before the Stockholm Primary 
Court of Administration, where the defendant argues that it is established in case 37589-10 
that Stockholm municipality itself performs expert valuations that are to be considered 
independent. 153  In Stockholm municipality the valuation unit, which performs expert 
valuations, and the project development unit, which makes decisions concerning land 
allocations, act under the same executive director and they are located on the same address 
(Fleminggatan 4) in Stockholm.154  
Despite these indications of expert valuations not being independent in Stockholm 
municipality, the court accepted the argument of the defendant, Stockholm city, in case 
37589-10 and ruled that the expert valuation made by the valuation unit should be considered 
independent.155 The argumentation was based on a report where the executive director for the 
development office stated that the valuation unit is organizationally separated from the project 
development unit.156 That is, the executive director for both units claimed that the units are 
separated from each other and therefore the expert valuation, made by the valuation unit, 
should be considered independent. 157 Thus, the court accepted this argumentation with lack of 
better arguments from the applicant. 
Since the Stockholm Primary Court of Administration, which is a court of first instance, 
ruled on the case 37589-10 it has no strong position as guiding case law, as would have been 
the case if the court of last instance ruled on the case. Furthermore, the Stockholm Primary 
Court of Administration has little obligation to investigate in cases like 37589-10 since it is of 
"positive character", meaning that it has no judicial negative consequences for the applicant, 
and the judgment that Stockholm municipality makes independent expert valuations could be 
considered to have limited value for other cases.158 The only conclusion that can be drawn is 
that it was not proven by the applicant that Stockholm municipality fails in making proper 
expert valuations.  
																																																								
152 Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, case 37589-10 (16 June 2011). 
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As mentioned above, the guidance from EU case law states that an expert valuation is 
independent when it is made before negotiations by a third party that has experience from real 
estate business and no conflict of interests in relation to the seller or the buyer.159 There is no 
guidance concerning when an independent expert valuation is performed by a body of the 
state. Since there is also a lack of guidance in primary law, in Commission guidelines and in 
doctrine, it would be advisable to have guidance from the Court of Justice in this regard, as 
has been requested by the applicant in the pending case 22781-16.160  
In accordance with the abrogated Commission Communication from 1997, a state 
authority should only be considered independent when performing expert valuations when 
undue influence on their findings is effectively excluded. According to the wording of the 
guideline, it should be incumbent on the authority to preclude influence on their findings, 
which could be hard to guarantee with no further guidance from the Commission.161 In order 
to avoid legal concerns, it should be advisable to hire a third party to perform expert 
valuations. 
5.3.3 EU Principles in Relation to Land Allocation Procedures 
The principle of equal treatment includes that actors on the market should be treated equally. 
State undertakings must be foreseeable and not include too much margin of discretion, in 
order to not discriminate any actors on the market.162 As observed above, performing direct 
allocation means a wide margin of discretion for municipalities since they have the possibility 
to choose a proper receiver of land allocations without restrictions, as long as it is done at 
market price. Performing direct allocations could therefore be questionable in relation to the 
principle of equal treatment.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the land allocation system includes informal 
conditions, making it hard for small developers to enter the market, which could lead to 
indirect discrimination even though the land allocation is performed through a tender 
procedure. The purpose of having informal conditions is perhaps not to discriminate 
developers but the effect could be discriminatory since there is a lack of foreseeability for 
small developers who have difficulty in fulfilling the informal conditions because of lack of 
information and market experience.163 
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Moreover, the principle of legal certainty also includes foreseeability.164 In the case 
Commission v France, the Court of Justice found that France violated the principle of legal 
certainty when actors were required to apply for permission in order to buy stock shares from 
a state-owned company exceeding a certain value. 165  There were no clear, objective 
conditions concerning when an application was accepted or denied, i.e. there were no limits 
for the state’s margin of discretion.166 The case has some similarities with the Swedish land 
allocation system since it concerns transfer of state-owned property (stock shares and land 
areas) to individuals and the possibility to make discretionary decisions concerning the 
receiver of the property: The land allocation system includes possibilities to discretionary 
choose a developer when performing a direct procedure and to have informal conditions that 
favour certain developers, making the system non-transparent. The free movement of capital 
could therefore be endangered by legal uncertainty, when there is a lack of possibility for 
developers to foresee how to receive land allocations.  
 
5.4 Conclusions from Chapter 5 
The conclusions that can be drawn from chapter 5 include that the framework concerning how 
land allocations should be performed is quite loose, which could be competitively 
problematic. Today’s performance of direct allocations could be problematic since there is no 
clear guidance concerning how to perform an independent expert valuation, meaning that 
municipalities themselves may perform expert valuations that might not be independent. The 
performance of tender allocations seems problematic in relation to the Commission Notice 
since they are non-transparent, could be discriminatory and are usually conditional. 
Moreover, today’s performance of tender allocations and direct allocations might be 
problematic in relation to the principle of equal treatment and the principle of legal certainty 
since the land allocation system contains informal conditions and a wide margin of discretion 
regarding the choice of developer, which could lead to discrimination and legal uncertainty 
concerning the free movement of capital. 
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6. Economic Analysis of the Land Allocation Framework 
Despite the fact that the framework, concerning how land allocations should be performed, is 
quite loose and could mean competitive problems, the framework may anyhow mean 
economic efficiency. I will therefore examine whether the loose framework contributes to 
economic efficiency, or whether a stricter framework would make the land allocation system 
more efficient. 
As established in chapter 4, the transaction costs for municipalities are high when 
performing tender allocations compared to the lower transaction costs they meet when 
performing direct allocations. Developers, on the other hand, have higher transaction costs 
when performing direct allocations compared to the lower transaction costs they meet in a 
tender procedure. In this following section I am going to analyse the level of economic 
efficiency with today’s loose framework concerning performance of land allocations, 
compared to the level of economic efficiency that would be the case with a stricter 
framework. 
Based on the potential competition problems with today’s loose framework that I have 
identified earlier in this chapter I will presume that a stricter framework concerning 
performance of tender allocations would mean that it is prohibited to have informal conditions 
and that municipalities are obliged to comply with their land allocation policies in order for 
the land allocation to be valid. Based on the potential competition problems concerning 
today’s performance of direct allocation, a stricter framework would mean that municipalities 
are obliged to outsource the expert valuation to a third party. In the following section I am 
going to analyse the level of transaction costs that municipalities and developers meet with 
today’s loose framework versus the level of transaction costs that they could meet with a 
stricter framework. In other words, I will analyse how the two different scenarios contribute 
to economic welfare.167 
The transaction costs when performing tender allocations are relatively high for 
municipalities compared to the transactions costs they meet in direct procedures since they, 
for example, have to establish how they want to exploit the land and then compare and 
analyse the offers.168 It is reasonable to believe that the transaction costs would be higher for 
municipalities if they were hindered to have informal conditions and were obliged to follow 
their land allocation policies, since that would mean that they have to allocate more resources 
to formulate very precise land allocation policies and conditions concerning each project.  																																																								
167 ’Economic welfare’ is described in chapter 1.6. 
168 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 85–86.	
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Performing tender allocations means transaction costs for developers too, but they are 
probably less significant since municipalities already have allocated resources to specify what 
they are looking for and how the selection will be made, which is therefore not for the 
developers to find out.169 It is reasonable to believe that the transaction costs would be lower 
for developers if the framework was stricter, since it would be clearer how to receive a land 
allocation and more developers would have access to the market without the informal 
conditions that could be discriminatory to small developers.170 
It is difficult to tell whether the increased economic welfare for developers would 
outweigh the decreased economic welfare for municipalities if the framework, when 
performing tender allocations, was stricter. Today’s transaction costs for developers in tender 
procedures are relatively low compared to the high transaction costs that municipalities meet. 
A stricter framework when performing tender allocations could therefore mean that the actors 
would move further away from each other in economic welfare. Having a stricter framework 
for tender allocations could therefore lead to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 171 but it is also 
reasonable to believe that the economic welfare would be unchanged. 
Performing direct allocation means low transaction costs for municipalities compared to 
the transaction costs they meet when performing tender allocations and the transaction costs 
developers meet in a direct procedure.172 It is reasonable to believe that the transaction costs 
could be higher if municipalities were obliged to outsource the expert valuations to a third 
party since hiring a third party to do the job is more expensive than doing it yourself. 
However there is no previous research concerning potential differences in the results when a 
valuation is made by a third party compared to when it is made by the municipality, which 
makes it difficult to fully take this aspect into consideration.  
Developers who receive direct allocations have transaction costs, in terms of ‘influence 
costs’, when convincing municipalities that they are suitable developers. Influence costs are 
difficult to calculate but might be significant.173 Furthermore, the economic welfare is low for 
developers who fail in receiving any direct allocations because they do not have access to the 
market.174 It is reasonable to believe that the transaction costs could be unchanged for 
developers if municipalities had to outsource expert valuations to a third party. Developers 
would still have to allocate resources on influence costs and the market access would not 
increase if third parties performed expert valuations. 																																																								
169 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 85–86. 
170 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 39–40. 
171 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is described in chapter 1.6. 
172 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 85. 
173 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), p. 85. 
174 Caesar, Kalbro & Lind (2013), pp. 66–67.	
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Since a stricter framework concerning performance of direct allocations probably would 
mean less economic welfare to municipalities and unchanged economic welfare to developers, 
compared to having today’s loose framework, it is reasonable to believe that today’s system 





The essential results from chapters 3–6 will be presented jointly in this section and further 
discussed below in section 7.2. 
Today’s system, where municipalities perform direct allocations without restrictions, 
could be problematic since there are indications that it distorts competition by favouring large 
established developers and hinders small developers to access the market. Receiving land 
through a direct allocation could mean an economic advantage for developers compared to 
developers who receive land through a tender procedure since there are indications that the 
land-price is set lower when the land is transferred through a direct procedure.  
Performing tender allocations, instead of direct allocations, in ordinary situations seems 
more economically efficient since it provides more economic welfare to at least developers 
but probably to municipalities as well. Performing tender allocations in complex situations, on 
the other hand, seems less economically efficient since it provides less economic welfare to 
both developers and municipalities. 
Today’s framework concerning performance of land allocations is loose, which could 
mean problems of competition law. The framework allows for municipalities to have informal 
conditions and a wide margin of discretion when choosing a suitable developer, as well as 
allowing municipalities to perform expert valuations themselves in a way that could be 
questioned as being non-independent. Overall, the framework seems non-transparent and 
discriminatory, which could be problematic in relation to the principle of equal treatment and 
the principle of legal certainty. 
Having a stricter framework concerning performance of land allocations would 
probably lead to less economic efficiency in direct procedures: Developers would have 
unchanged economic welfare when still having influence costs and municipalities would meet 
decreased economic welfare when having to outsource expert valuations to third parties. 
Concerning tender allocations, a stricter framework would lead to increased economic welfare 
for developers and decreased economic welfare for municipalities. It is, however, difficult to 





7.2 Concluding Discussion 
As mentioned in section 1.6 (Method and theory), provisions of EU law should always be 
interpreted in the light of the EU law as a whole, in accordance with the CILFIT case. Since 
the overall purpose of EU state aid regulations is to have economic efficiency within the 
common market, the aim of the land allocation system cannot solely include that it should be 
unproblematic in relation to EU state aid regulations – it should also be the most 
economically effective system. As examined in this thesis, today's system of performing land 
allocations could be problematic in relation to competition law and does not mean economic 
efficiency in all situations. This section will therefore discuss what changes may be needed in 
order for the system to comply with EU state aid regulations while also being economically 
efficient. I will commence by analysing the possibilities to appeal land allocation decisions 
that might contradict EU state aid regulations. 
The transaction costs are high when municipalities perform tender allocations but it 
seems economically efficient in complex situations to let municipalities act as they are doing 
today even though it might be problematic from a competition law point of view. Today 
municipalities mainly perform direct allocations and a court is to decide on the case when 
disputes appear. Act 2014:899 is therefore to be viewed as a liability rule and, in accordance 
with the transaction costs theory, it is suitable to have such a rule when the transaction costs 
are high since having a property rule instead would mean an unwelcome market hindrance.175  
However, a land allocation decision or policy can only be challenged through a legality 
procedure.176 In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation the EU and the member 
states shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties. Therefore, Sweden has to efficiently undertake measures in order to fulfil their 
obligations concerning the prevention of state aid. It is questionable whether Sweden fulfils 
the requirement of sincere cooperation when a legality procedure functions as the tool to 
make sure there are no elements of state aid in land allocation procedures. The legality 
procedure means that private actors on the market are expected to appeal in court when they 
believe a land allocation is unlawfully performed, without the possibility of having the 
decision changed to their advantage. Thus, a legality procedure means little incitement to 
appeal when municipalities unjustly perform land allocations. When doing research for this 
thesis I had difficulties in finding relevant case law concerning land allocation procedures, 
which could mean that few cases are brought to court because of the lack of incitement to 																																																								
175 Bastidas Venegas (2014), p. 189–190.	
176 Except from situations when municipalities decide to report their actions to the Commission in accordance 
with article 108(3) TFEU.  
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appeal. Perhaps another form of procedure to handle doubtful situations of land allocations 
would lead to more decisions on land allocations being appealed in court. It could, for 
example, be suitable to have a procedure where a challenged decision could be changed in 
favour for the appellant. 
Since the current possibility to challenge a decision does not seem efficient, it might 
also be necessary to make some adjustments to Act 2014:899 in order to make sure that there 
are no elements of state aid in land allocation procedures. The Swedish Competition 
Authority suggests that there should be a requirement for municipalities to perform a certain 
portion of land allocations as tender procedures. However, as examined in this thesis, it seems 
economically inefficient to perform tender allocations in complex situations, which therefore 
might be a relevant factor to take into consideration if adjusting Act 2014:899. Thus, it could 
be favourable to have a regulation that only allows for direct allocations in complex 
situations. However, it could be difficult to formulate such a regulation since it might be hard 
to specify what situations that should be included in the concept complex situations, i.e. in 
what situations there are circumstances that make only one actor suitable for receiving the 
land allocation. It should fall on municipalities to make that consideration but that would 
probably mean considerable amounts administrative work for them and have economically 
negative effects. Nonetheless it could be justifiable to make such adjustment in order to 
comply with EU state aid regulations. 
Today’s loose framework concerning how to perform land allocations seems more 
economically efficient than having a stricter framework in situations of direct allocations, 
while the prognosis is uncertain in situations of tender allocations. However, the loose 
framework seems to cause some problems of competition law and the economic gains of 
having a loose framework might therefore not be motivated. Today’s inefficient system of 
challenging land allocation decisions means that municipalities may continue with 
problematic land allocation procedures with low risk of being challenged in court. As 
mentioned above, I find it important to have a more effective system of challenging land 
allocation procedure than today’s legality procedure. If the challenging system is improved, it 
is necessary to also have a stricter framework that provides municipalities with adequate 
guidance in how to perform land allocations without the risk of breaching competition law 
and having their decisions challenged in court. 
In conclusion, Sweden does not have an efficient system to prevent illegal state aid in 
land allocation procedures. Suggestions for improvement include stronger incitements for 
actors to challenge land allocation decisions in court and clearer regulation regarding what 
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situations that allows for municipalities to perform direct allocations and a stricter framework 
regarding how to perform land allocations to avoid elements of illegal state aid. 
 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research  
Some land allocations result in leasing of municipal-owned land, sometimes aimed for 
building rental apartments, which is a way for municipalities to subsidize land to make it 
more attractive for developers.177 Since developers are almost unlimited in deciding rental 
levels for newly built apartments,178 it would be interesting to examine weather leasing of 
land for construction of apartments is to be considered as a transfer of value from the 
municipality to the developer. And if so, whether the system of performing land allocations 
aimed at leasing of land is compatible with EU state aid regulations when it is made below 
market price. This thesis does not include research on leasing of land but I consider the 
subject of great interest for further studies on land allocations. 
Regarding the lack of previous research concerning expert valuations and land prices 
when land is transferred after tender allocations compared to when transferred after direct 
allocations,179 I consider those subjects interesting for further research in studies of real estate 
and economics.	  
																																																								
177 Konkurrensverket, Rapport 2015:5, p. 72. 
178 L. Holmquist & R. Thomsson, Hyreslagen, Zeteo (2016), comment to 55c.	
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